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1. Introduction 
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Whether we support income redistribution depends on not only how well off our 
parents were or how egalitarian the society we grew up in was (predetermined factors of 
income), but also the bad luck, the successes, and the hardships that have shaped our lives 
(mobility experiences).1  As Piketty (1995) suggests, and the empirical literature confirms, our 
past mobility experiences refine our beliefs in the relative importance of hard work and luck, 
which affects our expectations of future income and, in turn, determines our support for 
redistribution.2  
 The literature is scant, however, on how we learn from these mobility experiences—
how the particulars of fortunes and hardships affect our support for redistribution. The timing 
of hardships, for example, is likely to matter. Being unemployed ten years ago possibly 
nudges us to support redistribution, but not as much as being unemployed last year does. The 
intensity of hardships matter too (going through hardships in which we had to cut down on 
food consumption to survive matters more than being unemployed with benefits), so does its 
persistence (ten-year unemployment in the past ten years increases support for redistribution 
more than one-year unemployment does). 
 In this paper, we examine how these particulars of mobility experiences affect support 
for redistribution in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We use the Life in Transition Surveys 
(LITS): The first wave (LITS I) interviews more than 29 thousand individuals in 29 countries 
and records their labor-market- and life histories over a period of eighteen years from 1989 to 
2006. The second wave (LITS II) records the life history of 39 thousand individuals during 
the recent global crises in 2007-08. Using these labor-market- and life histories, we construct 
                                                 
1 Upward- or downward mobility as part of society-wide (Piketty, 1995) or own (Benabou and Ok, 
2001) future income prospects has been discussed with support from empirical studies. Factors that 
explain variation in support for redistribution include cultural differences (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), 
parents’ influence (Benabou and Tirole, 2005), perception of fairness (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), 
and status of social standing (Corneo and Gruner, 2002). 
2 In general, theories of fairness judgments (Adams, 1965; Piketty, 1995) suggest that gainers from 
reforms who believe in hard work and effort are likely to oppose redistribution. 
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measures of intensity, timing, and persistence of personal history of mobility and we examine 
how these particulars of mobility affect support for redistribution. 
Countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia offer an interesting case to study how 
personal mobility affects support for redistribution. These countries were command 
economies that enjoyed extensive systems for redistribution but had to go through structural 
reforms, exposing their citizens to economic shocks that are, to some extent, beyond the 
control of any individual.3 The states provided education, housing, and healthcare services; 
citizens enjoyed heavily subsidized basic consumer goods and most people worked for the 
government or state-owned enterprises (Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996; Mikhalev, 2003). Then, 
in the early 1990s, most of these countries embarked on structural reforms (they liberalized, 
among others, price regulation, labor markets, exchange rate regimes, and trade policies), 
which increased income inequality and unemployment rates. Some skilled workers enjoyed 
higher salaries and more secured jobs (Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 1996, 1997), but many 
people not only lost their jobs, but also lost welfare benefits as the states trimmed social safety 
nets (Kapstein and Mandelbaum, 1997). A new pattern of social stratification emerged: a new 
elite class (mostly new capitalists), a middle class (people in the managerial and professional 
job), a lower class (mostly blue colored workers), and a socially deprived marginal class 
(Mikhalev, 2003). Haphazard redistribution of the states’ assets and rising income inequality 
polarized societies and exposed people in Eastern Europe and Central Asia to diverse personal 
mobility experiences (Mikhalev, 2003).  
These mobility experiences varied across time and space. Earlier in the transition 
period from 1989 until 1995, most of these countries had fallen into recession. Some 
                                                 
3 Some studies show support for redistribution in socialist countries is high, which may be caused by 
socialist cultural heritage (Corneo, 2001), behavioral norms (Ockenfels and Weimann, 1999), and the 
direct effect of communism (Alesina and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007). Corneo and Gruner (2002) also 
find, in 1992, Eastern Europeans have stronger support for redistribution than people from Western 
countries do. 
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economies, mostly European Union member states, improved later, but in 1998 a financial 
crisis hit the Russian Federation and affected most of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. However, since the early 2000s, these economies had grown, which improved their 
citizens’ living standards and reduced poverty rates: The average real per capita income rose 
from US$5,903 in 1998 to US$8,411 in 2005, moving fifty million people out of poverty 
(World Bank, 2008).4 Early but partial reforms created some early winners and losers in some 
countries. Subsequently, more comprehensive reforms led to even more gainers and losers 
(Mikhalev, 2003). Since people in these countries have diverse personal mobility experiences, 
in this paper we examine how these mobility experiences affect support for redistribution.  
We define support for redistribution, the dependent variable, as an indicator that 
equals one if an individual thinks that the state should be strongly involved in “reducing the 
gap between the rich and the poor”. As measures of downward mobility, we use a section on 
labor market and life histories in LITS I, which includes a set of questions on mobility 
experiences such as whether an individual had to accept wage cuts in a particular year from 
1989 to 2005, whether she had to sell some of her household assets, and whether she had to 
respond to shocks by cutting down food consumption.5 First, we construct three measures of 
intensity of mobility experience for each individual and each of the years: (1) whether an 
individual experienced any type of shocks, (2) whether an individual experienced labor 
market related shocks only, and (3) whether an individual responded to shocks by taking 
extreme measures. Then, we summarize each of the measures by adding up the number of 
years an individual had experienced downward mobility during the seventeen-year period. 
The measures are, therefore, the number of years an individual experienced downward 
mobility by intensity. For the timing of downward mobility, we divide the seventeen-year 
                                                 
4 The figures are in constant US$ equivalent of purchasing power parity. 
5 See LITS (2006) for more details of this survey. We exclude Mongolia and Turkey to focus on the 27 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia; we also exclude mobility experiences in 
2006 to make sure we examine the effects of past mobility experiences only. 
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period into several sub-periods and create measures of mobility for each period (a larger 
estimate of later shocks, which indicates more recent downward mobility, indicates the more 
recent an individual experienced shocks, the stronger her support for redistribution will be). 
For the persistence of downward mobility, we create measures of mobility by the number of 
years an individual experienced shocks (a larger estimate for more frequent shocks indicate 
the more persistent an individual experienced shocks, the stronger her support for 
redistribution will be). 
We use regression-control strategies to estimate the effects of downward mobility on 
support for redistribution. We include all available individual- and household characteristics 
in LITS I as well as primary sampling unit (PSU) fixed effects in the regressions, the latter to 
control for time-invariant determinants of support for redistribution that may correlate with 
downward mobility. To the extent that downward mobility is exogenous conditional on these 
individual- and household characteristics and the PSU fixed effects, a regression of support 
for redistribution on downward mobility and the control variables provides an unbiased 
estimate of the effects of downward mobility.  
We find downward mobility increases support for redistribution, but only the more 
intensive mobility: One year of downward mobility experience in which an individual had to 
respond by taking extreme measures increases support for redistribution by about three 
percent. We also find the timing and persistence of downward mobility matter: recent bad 
years matter more than earlier bad years do; more persistent bad years matter more too. For 
example, one bad-year in the last four years during the period of analysis increases support for 
redistribution by about three times as much as the average effect. Moreover, experiencing 
nine bad years or more increases support for redistribution by about 12-17 times larger than 
the average effect. Additional extensions and robustness checks by using alternative measure 
of support for redistribution, analyzing an alternative source of downward mobility (the recent 
6 
 
global crisis), considering systematic biases in evaluating individual preferences, and 
assessing the possibility of omitted variable bias all show that these basic results hold. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical strategy and data. 
Section 3 discusses the basic results. Section 4 discusses extensions and robustness checks. 
Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Empirical Strategy and Data 
We use the regression-control strategy and estimate the following model: 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝑋𝛾 + 𝑍 + 𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (1) 
where yij is a measure of support for redistribution of individual i who lives in PSU j; D is a 
measure of downward mobility of individual i, X and Z are vectors of individual- and 
household characteristics, respectively; and j and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 are PSU fixed effects and error terms, 
respectively. 
We include all observed individual- and household past characteristics such as 
individual’s age, gender, education, and household’s size, which may correlate with 
downward mobility and support for redistribution, to make sure downward mobility is as 
random as possible. We also include PSU fixed effects to control for PSU time-invariant, both 
observed and unobserved, determinants of support for redistribution that may correlate with 
downward mobility such as cultural-specific determinants of support for redistribution and 
region-specific inclination towards economic reform. To the extent that downward mobility is 
random conditional on their individual- and household characteristics as well as PSU fixed 
effects, the coefficient of D in Equation (1) is the effect of downward mobility on support for 
redistribution. 
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We use the first wave of the Life in Transition Survey (LITS I), a joint initiative of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank. LITS I, which is 
done in 2006, covers 29 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and surveys a 
nationally representative sample of 1,000 individuals within each country.6 The dataset 
includes household level data such as households’ roster, assets, and expenses. It also has 
information on the attitude and values, current activities, labor supply, and life history of 
29,000 individuals who are chosen at random among adults within each household. We 
exclude Mongolia and Turkey to focus on the 27 former socialist countries in Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia. We also exclude mobility experiences in 2006 to make sure we examine the 
effects of past mobility experiences only.7 We have, therefore, the labor-market- and life 
histories of about 27 thousand individuals for seventeen years from 1989 to 2005. 
We use individuals’ life history to construct measures of downward mobility. In the 
survey, individuals are asked whether they experienced some types of hardships, or whether 
they responded to these hardships by taking extreme measures, in each year from 1989 to 
2005. The questions are, among others, whether they received unemployment benefits, had to 
accept wage cuts, had to sell some of their household assets, and had to cut down on basic 
food consumption.  
We construct three measures of the intensity of downward mobility as follows. First, 
we create three dummies: one, a dummy for whether an individual experienced any types of 
shocks; two, a dummy for labor- market-related shocks only; and, three, a dummy for shocks 
that individuals responded to with extreme measures such as cutting down on food 
consumption or selling household assets to survive—all for each of the years from 1989 to 
2005. Then, we summarize each of these three set of dummies by adding them up across all 
                                                 
6 See LITS (2006) for more details of this survey. 
7 We exclude shocks in 2006 to avoid complications from possible endogeneity problems (our 
outcome variables are for the year 2006). 
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years from 1989 to 2005. Therefore, the three measures of downward mobility intensity are: 
(1) the number of years an individual experienced any types of shocks during the seventeen-
year period, (2) the number of years of labor market related shocks only, and (3) the number 
of years that an individual responded to hardships by taking extreme measures. 
To explore how timing and persistence of downward mobility affect support for 
redistribution, we also use other functions of the above measures of downward mobility. They 
are as follows: (1) for the timing we use the number of years and indicators of shocks in two 
eight-or-nine-year periods or four four-or-five-year period, and (2) for persistence we use 
indicators of shocks by the number of shocks experienced. Larger estimates of downward 
mobility for later periods, for example, would indicate that recent downward mobility affects 
support for redistribution more than downward mobility experienced a long time in the past 
does. Larger estimates of more frequent downward mobility in a sub-period would indicate 
persistent downward mobility affects support for redistribution more than occasional mobility 
does. 
We define the dependent variable, supports redistribution—an indicator equals one if 
an individual supports redistribution or zero otherwise—from a question on whether an 
individual thinks the state should be strongly involved in “reducing the gap between the rich 
and the poor”. As part of robustness checks, we also use alternative measures: whether an 
individual thinks the state should be strongly involved in “guaranteeing employment” or 
“guaranteeing low prices for basic goods and food”, and whether an individual agrees with the 
statement that “a market economy is preferable to any other form of economic system”. 
The individual and household characteristics we use as control variables are the 
number of adults in the household, the number of children in the household, gender, age, 
relationship to household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban 
areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of 
9 
 
ethnic minority. In some specifications, we also include individual characteristics in 1989, 
i.e., whether an individual worked, was rich, trusted people, and believed in efforts in 1989, as 
well as the father's and the mother’s characteristics in 1989, e.g., whether the father has 
college degree, a member of communist party, and worked in 1989. To test the robustness of 
the basic results, we also include current individual and household characteristics in some 
specifications, i.e., whether an individual worked in 2006, his or her job characteristics, and 
household's spending in 2006.8 Each of the control variables enters the regression as a full set 
of dummies, which makes the model very flexible. (For example, age enters as a set of 
dummies, one for each age cohort.) 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between support for redistribution and downward 
mobility. Each dot represents a country’s average support for redistribution and the proportion 
of individuals in the country that experienced downward mobility defined as “responded to 
shocks by taking extreme measures”. The relationship is noisy, which suggests that other 
factors affect support for redistribution, but we still see a positive relationship between 
downward mobility and support for redistribution. That is the relationship that we want to 
examine after we control for individual and household characteristics to make downward 
mobility as random as possible.  
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the key variables. Individuals who 
experienced downward mobility, and those who did not, seem to be quite similar in terms of 
individual and household characteristics (Panel A). A typical household has about three 
members on average; most of these are adults. About 40 percent of the individuals are males, 
47 years old on average, 37 percent live in urban areas, 20 percent has college degrees, and 10 
                                                 
8 We do not include these variables in most of our specifications because these variables can be also 
outcomes. 
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percent are members of minority groups. Their characteristics in 1989 do not seem to differ 
either (Panel B), neither do the father’s characteristics (Panel C). If anything, those who 
experienced downward mobility were more likely to work, trust people, and believe in efforts 
in 1989. There is some evidence that individuals who experienced downward mobility are 
more likely to support redistribution, though the differences may be insignificant statistically 
(Panel D). About 38 percent of respondents experienced shocks and responded by taking 
extreme measures; on average they had about six bad years (Panel E). 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
 
3. Empirical Results 
We now discuss the results. Sub-section 3.1 presents the basic results while sub-
sections 3.2 and 3.3 include PSU-fixed effects as well as other control variables. Sub-section 
3.4 explores the effects of the timing and persistence of downward mobility on support for 
redistribution. 
 
3.1. Basic results 
Table 2 presents the basic results. Each column is a regression of supports 
redistribution on downward mobility with or without individual- and household 
characteristics as control variables, which include gender; age; education; religion; ethnic 
minority; relationship with household head; whether the household lives in a rural area, urban 
area or metropolitan city; the number of adults in the household; and the number of children.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
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Columns 1-2 show the estimates of downward mobility, which we define as the 
number of years an individual experienced any types of shocks, without and with the control 
variables, respectively. (All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility.) Both estimates are 
significant statistically (robust standard errors, clustered by PSU, are in parentheses) and large 
economically: One-year experience of shocks increases support for redistribution by 0.3-0.4 
percentage point or about 0.4-0.6 percent. (About 68 percent of individuals in the sample 
support redistribution.) Considering that people who experienced hardships had six bad-years 
on average, people who experience hardships are 2-4 percent more likely to support 
redistribution. 
In columns 3-8 we use two other measures of intensity of downward mobility. Using 
labor market related shocks only as measures of downward mobility in columns 3-4, the 
estimates are small and insignificant statistically. But when we use another measure, 
“responded to shocks by taking extreme measures” in columns 5-6, we find the estimates to 
be larger than those in columns 1-2 and significant statistically. The estimate in column 6 
shows having a bad year increases the likelihood of supporting redistribution by 0.6 
percentage point. In the last two columns we include both responded-to-shocks-by-taking-
extreme-measures and experienced-labor-market-shocks-only. The estimates of the first 
remain significant statistically, while those of the second do not. The magnitude of estimates 
of the first is also similar to that in columns 5-6.  
 
3.2. Controlling for PSU fixed effects 
Support for redistribution varies by country, which suggests that PSU- or country-
specific factors affect how people think about redistribution. Grosjean (2011), for example, 
shows that cultural characteristics such as social trust in European countries evolves very 
slowly over time and vary across countries by the history of their imperial rule through 
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centuries. Moreover, individuals in different countries experienced different economic 
reforms, which depend on country-specific politics. Therefore, models we estimate in the 
previous sections, which ignore country-specific determinants of downward mobility and 
support for redistribution, may suffer from omitted variable bias. 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
In Table 3, to control for these time-invariant factors, we include PSU-fixed effects in 
addition to the individual- and household characteristics. Overall, the estimates are similar to 
those in Table 2. The estimate of responded to shocks by taking extreme measures is 
significant statistically; that of experienced labor market shocks only is not, both as the only 
measure of downward mobility in column 2 and when use jointly with responded to shocks by 
taking extreme measures in column 4. The magnitudes of the estimates are slightly smaller. 
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 suggest that, after controlling for PSU-fixed effects, a bad 
year increases support for redistribution by about 0.4 percentage point. These estimates mean 
a typical individual who responded to shocks by taking extreme measures is 3-4 percent more 
likely to support redistribution.  
The results in Tables 2-3 suggest labor-market-related shocks such as getting 
unemployed or having a wage cut do not necessarily increase support for redistribution. 
However, if the shocks are severe so that people have to respond by taking extreme measures 
such as cutting down on food consumption or selling household assets, experiencing these 
shocks does increase support for redistribution.  
In the rest of the analyses, for brevity, we will present the estimates of downward 
mobility defined as responded to shocks by taking extreme measures only.  
 
 
3.3. Controlling for other characteristics 
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The results are robust even after controlling for the PSU-fixed effects, but because we 
use control strategy as a method of identification, there is always a possibility that the models 
suffer from omitted variable bias. Therefore, in Table 4, we include other past individual- and 
parental characteristics as additional controls. In some specifications, we also include current 
individual characteristics such as current job characteristics and household spending to see 
whether the direct effects of downward mobility on support for redistribution are large. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
In column 2 we include individual characteristics in 1989 as additional controls, i.e., 
job status in 1989, the position along a ten-step economic ladder, the degree of trust in people, 
and the belief on whether effort and hard work as well as intelligence and skills are the most 
important to succeed in life. In column 3 we add father characteristics (education level of the 
father, job status, and whether he is a member of a communist party) further, in column 4 the 
same set of characteristics of the mother as well. The estimates are 0.4-0.5, similar to that in 
column 1, which is from a regression without the additional controls. They also remain 
significant statistically. 
We then include current individual characteristics in columns 5-7. In column 5 we 
include an indicator of whether an individual worked in 2006, in column 6 we add job 
characteristics (a full set of dummies for types of occupations, industry, and whether self-
employed) and the logarithm of household spending in 2006—the estimates do not change 
much. In column 7 we include a set of individual characteristics in 2006 (i.e., the position 
along a ten-step economic ladder, the degree of trust in people, and the belief on whether 
effort and hard work as well as intelligence and skills are the most important to succeed in 
life). The estimate falls to 0.3 and remains significant statistically. Even after we include 
individual characteristics in 2006 in the regression, which muddle the estimation of total 
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effects of downward mobility, we still find that downward mobility experiences increase 
support for redistribution. 
  Table 4 shows that overall the basic results are robust. In all iterations, one bad year 
increases support for redistribution by about 0.4 percentage points. Even after controlling for 
current individual characteristics in 2006, the estimates remain large economically and 
significant statistically, which indicate that downward mobility also directly affects support 
for redistribution, not only through its effects on current employment status and current 
beliefs in efforts, hard work, and luck.  
In the rest of the analyses, to get the total effects of downward mobility on support for 
redistribution, we exclude these current individual characteristics as additional independent 
variables.9 To keep most individuals in the sample, we do not include the additional 
individual characteristics in 1989 either.10  Instead, we regress a measure of support for 
redistribution on a measure of downward mobility and a set of basic control variables, i.e., 
gender, age, education, religion, ethnic minority, relationship with household head, whether 
the household lives in a rural area, urban area or metropolitan city, the number of adults in the 
household, the number of children, and PSU fixed effects.11 
 
3.4. Timing and persistence of downward mobility 
In Tables 2-4 we assume a bad year has the same effects regardless of whether it 
happened a long time ago and whether they happened consecutively—we ignore the timing 
and persistence of hardships. In Table 5 we relax this assumption in four ways: (1) we use the 
                                                 
9 These current characteristics are bad controls because they can be also outcomes (Angrist and Piscke, 
2009). 
10 In column 2, after controlling for additional individual characteristics in 1989, the number of 
observations falls from 27 thousands to about 19 thousands. After controlling for parental 
characteristics in column 4, it falls further to 17 thousand observations. 
11 Including the additional past characteristics does not change the results. They are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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number of years an individual responded to shocks by taking extreme measures in two eight-
year periods or four four-year periods, (2) we use indicators of shocks by periods, (3) we use 
indicators of shocks by number of shocks experienced, and (4) we control for the number of 
changes of downward mobility from one year to another.12 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
In Panel A we use the number of shocks by sub-period to allow downward mobility 
early and later in the period of analysis to have different effects. Panel A.1 shows the 
estimates in which we use the number of bad years by two eight-year periods as the measures 
of downward mobility. The estimate of the 1989-1997 period is small and insignificant 
statistically, but that of 1998-2005 is significant. The magnitude of the latter is also large, 
about 0.9, which equals four percent increase in the likelihood of supporting redistribution by 
those who experienced hardships in 1998-2005 on average (those who experienced shocks in 
the last eight year period had 4.3 bad years on average). In Panel A.2 we use four four-year 
periods. Again similar picture appears: Experiencing shocks early in the period does not seem 
to matter, while later bad years do. The magnitude of the estimate of the last four year period, 
2002-2005, is large, 1.2, which means individuals who experienced shocks in the last four 
years are four percent more likely to support redistribution  (those who experienced shocks in 
the last four year period had three bad years on average). 
In Panel B we use a set of indicators instead of the number of shocks as the measures 
of downward mobility. We see similar results. Experiencing shocks recently increases support 
for redistribution. The estimate of the last four year period in Panel B.2 in particular is large. 
Having at least one bad year in 2002-2005 increases support for redistribution by 3.9 
percentage points. 
                                                 
12 We actually use two eight-or-nine-year periods and four four-or-five-year periods, but we will call 
these two eight-year periods or four four-year periods for brevity. 
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In Panel C we use indicators of shocks by number of shocks to allow occasional- and 
persistent shocks to have different effects on support for redistribution. The estimate in Panel 
C.1 shows that having at least one bad year increases support for redistribution by three 
percentage points, which is similar to the results in Tables 2-3. In Panel C.2 we introduce 
three dummies, no shock, 1-8 shocks and 9-17 shocks (the excluded category is no shock). 
Experiencing eight bad years or less increases support for redistribution by 2.3 percentage 
points, while experiencing nine bad years or more increases support for redistribution by 
about 5.6 percentage points. In Panel C.3 we include five dummies: no shock, 1-4 shocks, 5-8 
shocks, 9-12 shocks, and 13-17 shocks. Similar results appear. Having less than five bad years 
increases support for redistribution by 1.7 percentage points, while having 9-12 shocks or 13-
17 shocks increases support for redistribution by about 5-7 percentage points, which is 
equivalent to about 7-8 percent increase in support for redistribution. 
In Panel D we examine whether experiencing mobility changes from one year to 
another—the ebb and flow of hardships—affect support for redistribution. Including the 
number of changes of downward mobility from one year to another during the seventeen year 
period seems to increase support for redistribution, but it is significant statistically at ten 
percent only (Panel D.1). Once we control for the number of shocks in Panel D.2, however, 
the number of changes of downward mobility becomes insignificant statistically as indicated 
by its large standard error. 
To summarize, these results show that: (1) experiencing at least one-year shocks 
(defined as responded to shocks by taking extreme measures) in the previous seventeen years 
increases support for redistribution by three percentage points on average; (2) shocks 
experienced a long time ago do not seem to matter, while recent shocks do—one bad year in 
the last four year period increases support for redistribution by 1.2 percentage points; (3) 
persistent shocks matter more than occasional ones—having at least nine bad years in the 16 
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year period of analysis increases support for redistribution by more than five percentage 
points, and (4) the ebbs and flow of downward mobility does not seem to matter once we take 
into account the intensity of the shocks. 
 
 
4. Extensions and robustness checks 
In this section we show some extensions and robustness checks. Table 6 explores the 
interactions between downward mobility and individual characteristics. Tables 7 and 8 
analyze the effects by group of individuals and group of countries. Tables 9 and 10 use 
alternative measures of support for redistribution and downward mobility. Table 11 examines 
another source of shocks, the recent economic crisis. Tables 12 consider biased perception of 
individual’s relative position in income distribution, and Table 13 examines whether 
unobservable factors undermine the OLS estimations.  
 
4.1. Interactions between Downward Mobility and Individual Characteristics 
Table 6 presents the interactions between individual characteristics and downward 
mobility. The estimates of downward mobility are positive and significant statistically; they 
are also quite stable across all specifications. We find that females and non-college graduates 
are more likely to support redistribution, which are in line with papers in this line of literature. 
We also find that individuals who are 50 years old or older, those who believed in the 
importance of effort in determining success in life in 1989, and those who trusted people in 
1989 are more likely to support redistribution, which seem to be in contrast with the findings 
in the literature.13 Considering that these are individual characteristics in the past, the results 
                                                 
13 See, for examples, Fong (2001), Corneo and Gruner (2002), Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Alesina 
and La Ferrera (2005), and Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007). 
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are perhaps unsurprising because some people had experienced downward mobility since then 
and may have changed their beliefs in the importance of effort in determining success and 
their trust in people in 2006 when the survey was done, which in turn affect their support for 
redistribution. None of the interaction terms is significant statistically, however, except the 
interaction between college graduates and downward mobility.  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
4.2. Analyses by Groups of Individuals and Groups of Countries 
In previous analyses, we implicitly assume the control variables affect different groups 
of individuals similarly. In Table 7 we relax this assumption by estimating the effects of 
downward mobility by group of individuals, i.e., gender, older than 50 years, has college 
degrees, high on the ten-step economic ladder in 1989, a member of ethnic minority, believed 
in the importance of effort in determining success in 1989, trusted people in 1989, and father 
was a member of communist party.  
Overall, the results are robust. All estimates are positive: They vary from 0.2 to 0.6 
percentage point. They are also significant statistically except for individuals who were high 
on the ten-step economic ladder in 1989 and those whose fathers are members of communist 
parties. There seems to be similar effects across groups, though some groups (i.e., individuals 
who were older than 50 years, college graduates, low on the ten-step economic ladder in 
1989, members of ethnic minorities, and those who did not believe in the importance of effort 
in determining success in 1989 as well as those whose fathers were members of communist 
parties) are more likely to support redistribution.  
<Insert Table 7 here> 
In Table 8 we estimate the effects of downward mobility by group of countries. The 
largest effect is estimated for the EU countries (0.8 percentage point), and the lowest for non-
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CIS and non-EU countries (that is, others in column 3).  Though the latter remains positive, it 
is insignificant statistically.  
<Insert Table 8 here> 
4.3. Use of Alternative Measures of Support for Redistribution and Downward Mobility 
So far, we have been using the question on whether state should reduce gap in income 
between the rich and the poor as measure of support for redistribution. In Table 9, we 
consider alternative dependent variables: whether state should guarantee employment, 
whether state should guarantee low prices of basic goods, whether poverty is caused by 
injustice in society, and whether market economy is not preferable. All estimates are positive 
and significant statistically; they vary from 0.2 to 0.8 percentage point. 
<Insert Table 9 here> 
Table 10 shows the results using alternatives measures of downward mobility: whether 
an individual’s household has moved down the ten-step economic ladder since 1989,  whether 
one’s life is worse than most high school classmates’,  whether one’s life is worse than 
parents’, and whether one expects one’s to have worse future. All estimates are positive and 
significant statistically. Economically they are also large. The estimate in column 1, for 
example, shows having moved down the economic ladder since 1989 increases support for 
redistribution by four percentage points. Moreover, not only that past downward mobility 
increases support for redistribution, expectation of future downward mobility experienced by 
children does too as column 5 shows. For instance, being pessimistic of one’s children’s 
future increases support for redistribution by five percentage points. When we include past 
and future downward mobility in column 6, the estimates remain similar.  
<Insert Table 10 here> 
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4.4. Analysis of Downward Mobility Experienced During the Recent Economic Crisis  
We now look at the effects of downward mobility caused by other sources of shocks, 
i.e., the recent economic crisis in 2007-08, using LITS II. Table 11 presents the results. We 
use three measures of supports distribution (i.e., income should be more equal, poverty is 
caused by injustice in society, and market economy is not preferable) and three measures of 
downward mobility (i.e., affected much by the crisis, responded to shocks by taking extreme 
measures, and responding to crisis by taking some measures). We find all estimates are 
positive and significant statistically. The estimates are economically large, in particular when 
we use whether poverty is caused by injustice in society as the measure of support for 
redistribution in columns 4-6. Those who were affected much by the economic crisis in 
column 4, for example, increase support for redistribution by eight percentage points, while 
those who responded to crisis by taking some extreme measures, which is similar to the 
measure we use in the basic results, in column 5 increase support for redistribution by ten 
percentage points. 
<Insert Table 11 here> 
4.5. Analyses of Individuals whose Actual- and Perceived Incomes are Matched 
Cruces, Perez-Trugliain and Tetaz (2013) show that people have biased perception of 
their relative position in income distribution: Some people say they are poor when in fact their 
incomes are higher than average. Some say they are richer than average when their incomes 
are actually low.14 In Table 12 we check whether these biased perceptions of incomes may 
compromise our results. In column 1, we include only individuals whose perceived position in 
a ten-step economic ladder and actual decile-group of household spending are matched. In 
columns 2-4 we also include individuals whose biases are at most one-, two, and three decile-
                                                 
14 They also find that people who are told that they overestimate their relative position are more likely 
to support redistribution. 
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groups, respectively. Overall, the results are robust. The estimates are all positive, about 0.4-
0.5 percentage point, and significant statistically.  
<Insert Table 12 here> 
4.6. Testing for the effect of unobserved factors 
Finally, we check how severe omitted bias problems affect our main results. We use a 
statistic Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) develop using selection on observables to estimate 
the potential bias from unobservables, the ratio R= 
𝛽𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙̂
𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑̂ − 𝛽𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙̂
 , which indicates how 
much stronger the selection on unobservables, relative to selection on observables, needs to be 
to explain away the estimated effect of the past events on redistributive preferences.   
<Insert Table 13 here> 
Table 13 provides the ratios, which we calculate using the baseline estimates in Table 
2. We define full model as regressions with the individual- and household characteristics and 
restricted model as those without the control variables. For estimates in Table 2, the ratios of 
all models are over three except column 2, with an average value of R around three. This 
implies that, on average, the selection on unobservables has to be at least three times stronger 
than the selection on observables to explain away the estimated regression coefficients of the 
past events on attitudes towards redistribution. Thus, it is plausible to assume that it is 
unlikely the estimates are affected by the omitted variable bias.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Downward mobility increases support for redistribution, but only if it is severe: There 
is no evidence that being unemployed increases support for redistribution. However,  being 
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unemployed and responding to the shocks by taking extreme measures does—one year of the 
latter type increases support for redistribution by about three percent. The timing of 
downward mobility matters too (recent bad years matter more than earlier bad years do), so 
does its persistence (more persistent shocks matter more than occasional ones). For examples, 
one bad-year in the most recent four years increases support for redistribution about three 
times as large as the average effect and experiencing nine bad years or more increases support 
for redistribution by about 12-17 times larger than the average effect.  
 These basic results are robust to systematic biases that people may have when they 
evaluate their preferences for redistribution (Cruces, Perez-Trugliain and Tetaz, 2013). Our 
tests to explore the effect of measurement errors in people’s subjective responses toward 
redistribution (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Fong, 2007), and the possibility of omitted 
variable bias, judged by the ratio proposed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), confirm the 
stability of the basic OLS estimates.  The results are also robust to alternative measures of 
support for redistribution, alternative measures of downward mobility, and other sources of 
economic shocks. 
Many papers such as Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and  Ravallion and Lokshin 
(2000) have provided the empirical evidence for Piketty’s (1995) learning model, but we 
believe this paper adds to the literature in a number of ways. One, we provide a richer picture 
of how mobility experiences shape individual preferences towards redistributive policies. 
Two, we show that support for redistribution is not static or sluggish; rather it responds to 
severe, recent, and persistent mobility experiences. Three, we highlight the importance of the 
particulars of downward mobility experiences, their intensity, timing, and persistence as 
determinants of support for redistribution, which calls for a refinement of Piketty’s (1995) 
learning model.  
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 A limitation of this paper is that our measures of downward mobility are not 
exogenous. If there is an unobserved factor that positively correlates with both downward 
mobility and support for redistribution (for example, if people who are more likely to be 
unemployed are also more likely to support redistribution), our OLS estimates will be too big. 
The Altonji, Elder, and Taber’s (2005) statistic, however, indicates these problems probably 
are modest, if there are any. Besides, downward mobility caused by a global crisis or 
structural reforms are, to some extent, beyond the control of any individual in our sample. 
Two, people may have systematic biases when they evaluate their relative income, but we 
address this concern by analyzing downward mobility using sub-samples of people whose 
biases are small. Three, downward mobility, which we define using retrospective information, 
may be unreliable—a concern that we have no answer to. But, perhaps, recalling the years 
when we experienced economic shocks, especially when the shocks are severe, is etched in 
our memory and so less likely to be unreliable. Our basic results suggest that this is a 
possibility. 
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Figure 1  The Relationship between Support for Redistribution and Downward Mobility 
 
Notes: Each dot represents a country’s average support for redistribution and proportion of 
individuals in the country that experienced downward mobility; the line is a regression line of the 
first on the second. Downward mobility is an indicator of whether an individual had experienced 
shocks and responded by taking extreme measures the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution 
equals one if an individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise.
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Table 1  Summary Statistics 
   
  
No experience 
of downward 
mobility 
Experienced 
downward 
mobility 
  (1) (2) 
A. Individual- and household characteristics   
Number of adults in the household 2.69 2.71 
 (1.38) (1.42) 
Number of children in the household 0.45 0.61 
 (0.86) (1.01) 
Male 0.43 0.38 
 (0.50) (0.49) 
Age 47.01 46.71 
 (18.58) (16.62) 
Lives in urban areas 0.37 0.37 
 (0.48) (0.48) 
Has college degree 0.20 0.18 
 (0.40) (0.39) 
A member of ethnic minority 0.10 0.11 
 (0.30) (0.31) 
B. Individual characteristics in 1989   
Worked in 1989 0.52 0.54 
 (0.50) (0.50) 
Rich in 1989 0.34 0.37 
 (0.47) (0.48) 
Trusted people in 1989 0.60 0.69 
 (0.49) (0.46) 
Believed in efforts in 1989 0.78 0.80 
 (0.41) (0.40) 
C. Father's characteristics   
Has college degree 0.13 0.12 
 (0.34) (0.33) 
A member of communist party 0.13 0.17 
 (0.34) (0.37) 
Worked in 1989 0.95 0.95 
 (0.22) (0.21) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the mean. The figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 1  Summary Statistics (continued) 
   
  
No experience 
of downward 
mobility 
Experienced 
downward 
mobility 
  (1) (2) 
D. Preferences towards redistribution   
Supports redistribution 0.67  0.71  
 (0.47) (0.45) 
Agrees that state should guarantee employment 0.77  0.83  
 (0.42) (0.38) 
Agrees that state should guarantee low prices 0.72  0.78  
 (0.45) (0.42) 
Agrees that poverty is because of injustice in society 0.44  0.51  
 (0.50) (0.50) 
Does not prefer market economy 0.56  0.62  
 (0.50) (0.49) 
E. Downward mobility   
Number of years experienced shocks and responded 0 5.88 
by taking extreme measures 0 (5.13) 
Household is worse now than in 1989 0.55 0.66 
  (0.50) (0.47) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the mean. The figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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Table 2  Basic Results 
         
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution               
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Downward mobility         
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures      0.73** 0.56** 0.76** 0.58** 
(number of years)     (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Experienced labor market shocks (number of years)   -0.16 -0.10   -0.31* -0.22 
   (0.13) (0.13)   (0.13) (0.13) 
Both the above (number of years) 0.44** 0.34**       
  (0.09) (0.09)             
Individual- and household characteristics        
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.03 0.0001 0.02 0.002 0.03 0.005 0.03 
Number of obs. 
    
26,991  
    
26,925  
    
26,991  
    
26,925  
    
26,991  
    
26,925  
    
26,991  
    
26,925  
Notes:  The numbers in each column are the estimates of measures of downward mobility from a separate regression of supports 
redistribution on measures of downward mobility with or without a set of individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults 
in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in 
urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are 
multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is the number of years an individual had experienced economic shocks (defined in the 
left column) in the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero 
otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 3  Controlling for PSU Fixed Effects 
     
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution         
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Downward mobility     
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures   0.43** 0.43** 
 (number of years)   (0.07) (0.07) 
Experienced labor market shocks (number of years)  0.03  -0.03 
  (0.09)  (0.09) 
Both the above (number of years) 0.27**    
  (0.07)       
Individual- and household characteristics    
PSU fixed effects    
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Number of obs. 
    
26,925  
    
26,925  
    
26,925  
    
26,925  
Notes:  The numbers in each column are the estimates of measures of downward mobility from a 
separate regression of supports redistribution on measures of downward mobility, PSU fixed 
effects, and a set of individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the 
household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, 
nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, 
and whether the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 
for legibility. Downward mobility is the number of years an individual had experienced economic 
shocks (defined in the left column) in the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if 
an individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses 
are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 4  Controlling for Other Covariates 
        
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Downward mobility        
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures 0.43** 0.44** 0.45** 0.44** 0.43** 0.40** 0.25* 
 (number of years) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Individual- and household characteristics       
Additional individual characteristics in 1989       
Individual characteristics in 2006       
Worked in 2006       
Job characteristics in 2006       
Spending in 2006       
Income, belief in trust, and belief in efforts in 2006       
Father characteristics       
Mother characteristics       
PSU fixed effects       
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 
Number of obs. 
    
26,925  
    
19,291  
    
17,331  
    
17,014  
    
17,014  
    
17,005  
    
16,522  
Notes:  The number in each column is the estimate of a measure of downward mobility from a separate regression of supports 
redistribution on downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, a set of individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults 
in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, nationality, whether the 
individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of ethnic 
minority), a set of additional individual characteristics in 1989, a set of individual characteristics in 2006, a set of father 
characteristics, and a set of mother characteristics. All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is the 
number of years an individual had responded to shocks by taking extreme measures in the 1989-2005 period; supports 
redistribution equals one if an individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses 
are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, 
respectively. 
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Table 5  Allowing for More Flexible Effects of Downward Mobility 
  
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution   
A. Number of shocks by periods  
A.1. Two eight-or-five-year periods  
1989-1997 -0.07 
 (0.16) 
1998-2005 0.87** 
 (0.14) 
A.2. Four four-or-five-year periods  
1989-1993 0.21 
 (0.32) 
1994-1997 -0.26 
 (0.40) 
1998-2001 0.47 
 (0.39) 
2002-2005 1.23** 
 (0.31) 
B. Indicators of shocks by periods  
B.1. Two eight-or-five-year periods  
1989-1997 0.50 
 (0.77) 
1998-2005 3.49** 
 (0.69) 
B.2. Four four-or-five-year periods  
1989-1993 1.77 
 (0.95) 
1994-1997 -0.88 
 (0.99) 
1998-2001 1.16 
 (0.89) 
2002-2005 3.85** 
 (0.81) 
Notes:  The numbers in each sub-panel is the estimates of measures of downward mobility from a separate 
regression of supports redistribution on a set of measures of downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a 
set of individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of 
children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in 
urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of ethnic 
minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is a function of responded 
to shocks by taking extreme measures for the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an 
individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and 
one percent, respectively. 
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Table 5  Allowing for More Flexible Effects of Downward Mobility (continued) 
  
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution   
C. Indicators of shocks by number of shocks  
C.1. Two dummies  
One shock or more 2.96** 
 (0.68) 
C.2. Three dummies  
1-8 shocks 2.32** 
 (0.71) 
9-17 shocks 5.60** 
 (1.10) 
C.3. Five dummies  
1-4 shocks 1.67* 
 (0.77) 
5-8 shocks 4.27** 
 (1.07) 
9-12 shocks 6.19** 
 (1.59) 
13-17 shocks 5.54** 
 (1.24) 
D. Control for the ebb and flow of downward mobility  
D.1.Number of changes in downward mobility only  
Number of changes in downward mobility 0.56 
 (0.29) 
D.2. Number of shocks and number of changes in mobility  
Number of changes in downward mobility 0.21 
 (0.29) 
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures (number of years) 0.41** 
  (0.08) 
Notes:  The numbers in each sub-panel are the estimates of measures of downward mobility from a separate 
regression of supports redistribution on measures of downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a set of 
individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of children, 
gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban 
areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of ethnic 
minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is a function of responded 
to shocks by taking extreme measures for the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an 
individual supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and 
one percent, respectively. 
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Table 6  The Effects of Downward Mobility by Individual Characteristics 
         
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Downward mobility         
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures 0.37** 0.48** 0.36** 0.42** 0.42** 0.52** 0.31** 0.44** 
(number of years) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.17) (0.12) (0.08) 
Factors and interactions with downward mobility         
Male -2.60**        
 (0.73)        
… * shocks 0.14        
 (0.12)        
Older than 49 years  6.39**       
  (0.76)       
… * shocks  -0.03       
  (0.12)       
Has college degree   -5.66**      
   (0.84)      
… * shocks   0.44**      
   (0.17)      
Rich in 1989    0.58     
    (0.77)     
… * shocks    -0.09     
    (0.13)     
Notes:  The numbers in each column are the estimates of a measure of downward mobility and its interaction term with an individual 
characteristics from a separate regression of supports redistribution on downward mobility, its interaction, PSU fixed effects, and a set of 
individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to 
household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether 
the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is a function of 
responded to shocks by taking extreme measures for the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports 
income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two 
stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 6  The Effects of Downward Mobility by Individual Characteristics (continued) 
         
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution                 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
A member of ethnic minority     2.37    
     (1.35)    
… * shocks     0.02    
     (0.19)    
Believed in efforts in 1989      2.83**   
      (0.88)   
… * shocks      -0.14   
      (0.18)   
Trusted people in 1989       1.83*  
       (0.77)  
… * shocks       0.15  
       (0.13)  
Father was a member of communist party        -0.35 
        (0.95) 
… * shocks        -0.06 
        (0.18) 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 
Number of obs. 
     
26,925  
    
26,925  
     
26,925  
    
24,365  
    
26,925  
    
25,868  
    
23,162  
    
25,883  
Notes:  The numbers in each column are the estimates of a measure of downward mobility and its interaction term with an individual 
characteristics from a separate regression of supports redistribution on downward mobility, its interaction, PSU fixed effects, and a set of 
individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to 
household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether 
the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is a function of 
responded to shocks by taking extreme measures for the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports 
income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two 
stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 7  Allowing Different Groups to be Affected Differently by the Covariates 
   
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution Yes No 
  (1) (2) 
A. Male   
Downward mobility 0.44** 0.41**  
(0.13) (0.10) 
B. Older than 50 years   
Downward mobility 0.54** 0.37** 
(0.10) (0.11) 
C. Has college degree   
Downward mobility 0.60** 0.39** 
(0.23) (0.08) 
D. Rich in 1989   
Downward mobility 0.21 0.47** 
(0.14) (0.10) 
E. A member of ethnic minority   
Downward mobility 0.74* 0.41** 
(0.30) (0.08) 
F. Believe in efforts in 1989   
Downward mobility 0.35** 0.53* 
(0.08) (0.22) 
G. Trust people in 1989   
Downward mobility 0.40** 0.37* 
(0.10) (0.15) 
H. Father was a member of communist party   
Downward mobility 0.16 0.45** 
(0.24) (0.08) 
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of a measure of downward mobility from a 
separate regression of supports redistribution on downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, 
and a set of individual- and household characteristics (the number of adults in the 
household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, 
nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college 
degree, and whether the individual is a member of ethnic minority) on a group of 
individuals defined in the left column and the header. (The top-right cell, for example, is 
for females only.) All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility 
is the number of years an individual had responded to shocks by taking extreme measures 
in the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports 
income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust 
standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a 
level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 8  The Effects of Downward Mobility by Groups of Countries 
    
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution CIS EU Others 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Downward mobility    
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures  0.33** 0.83** 0.22 
(number of years) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.22 0.21 
Number of obs. 10,980 9,977 5,968 
Notes:  The number in each column is the estimate of a measure of downward 
mobility from a separate regression of supports redistribution on downward mobility, 
PSU fixed effects, and a set of individual- and household characteristics (the number 
of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to 
household head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, 
whether the individual has college degree, and whether the individual is a member of 
ethnic minority) on a group of individuals lived in the group of countries defined in 
the header. All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward mobility is 
the number of years an individual had responded to shocks by taking extreme 
measures in the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual 
supports income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses 
are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical 
significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 9  Using Alternative Measures of Support for Redistribution  
     
Dependent variable: Agrees with the following State should 
guarantee 
employment 
State should 
guarantee low 
prices 
Poverty is 
because 
injustice in 
society 
Market 
economy is 
not preferable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Downward mobility     
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures 0.22** 0.26** 0.75** 0.55** 
 (number of years) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.20 
Number of obs. 26,925 26,915 25429  26,900 
Notes:  The number in each column is the estimate of a measure of downward mobility from a separate regression of a 
measure of supports redistribution on downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a set of individual- and household 
characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household 
head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and 
whether the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Downward 
mobility is the number of years an individual had responded to shocks by taking extreme measures in the 1989-2005 
period; supports redistribution is an indicator defined in the header. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 10  Using Alternative Measures of Downward Mobility 
       
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution             
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Downward mobility       
Move down the economic ladder 3.66**     3.38** 
 (0.70)     (0.75) 
Worse in life than most high school classmates  5.25**     
  (0.82)     
Worse in life than parents   2.98**    
   (0.66)    
Household is worse now than in 1989    7.05**   
    (0.76)   
Children will have worse future     4.51** 4.35** 
          (0.72) (0.75) 
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Number of obs. 
    
24,292  
    
18,161  
    
24,841  
    
23,296  
    
23,445  
    
21,266  
Notes:  The numbers in each column are the estimates of measures of downward mobility from a separate regression of 
supports redistribution on measures of downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a set of individual- and household 
characteristics (the number of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household 
head, religion, nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and 
whether the individual is a member of ethnic minority). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Measures of 
downward mobility are indicators defined in the left column; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports 
income redistribution in 2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. 
One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 11  Using the Recent Global Crisis as a Measure of Downward Mobility 
          
Dependent variable: Agrees with the followings 
Income should be more 
equal 
Poverty is because injustice 
in society 
Market economy is not 
preferable 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Downward mobility          
Affected much by the economic crisis 2.16**   8.24**   3.40**   
 (0.79)   (0.89)   (0.89)   
Responded to crisis by taking extreme measures  4.27**   9.78**   6.31**  
  (0.68)   (0.77)   (0.78)  
Responded to crisis by taking some measures   2.63**   9.56**   5.79** 
   (0.82)   (0.88)   (0.92) 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 
Number of obs. 27,441 29,329 29329  26,114 27,826 27,826 24,208 25,651 25,651 
Notes:  The number in each column is the estimate of a measure of downward mobility from a separate regression of a measure of supports 
redistribution on a measure of downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a set of individual- and household characteristics (number of adults in the 
household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, whether the individual lives in urban areas, and whether the 
individual has college degree). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. Measures of downward mobility are indicators defined in the left 
column; supports redistribution equals one if an individual agrees with the statement in the header. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 12  Using Samples with Matched Perceived- and Actual Incomes 
     
Dependent variable: Supports redistribution Matched The 
difference is 
one or less 
The 
difference is 
two or less 
The 
difference is 
three or less 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Downward mobility     
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures  0.50* 0.50** 0.43** 0.41** 
(number of years) (0.25) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) 
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Number of obs. 3,195 8,844 14131  18,600 
Notes:  The number in each column is the estimate of downward mobility from a separate regression of supports 
redistribution on downward mobility, PSU fixed effects, and a set of individual- and household characteristics (the 
number of adults in the household, the number of children, gender, age, relationship to household head, religion, 
nationality, whether the individual lives in urban areas, whether the individual has college degree, and whether the 
individual is a member of ethnic minority) on a group of individuals defined in the header. All estimates are multiplied by 
100 for legibility. Downward mobility is the number of years an individual had responded to shocks by taking extreme 
measures in the 1989-2005 period; supports redistribution equals one if an individual supports income redistribution in 
2006 or zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by PSU. One and two stars indicate 
statistical significance at a level of five and one percent, respectively. 
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Table 13 Comparing the Strength of Unobservable Factors in Regression Models 
     
        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Downward mobility     
Responded to shocks by taking extreme measures    0.73 0.76 
(number of years)   0.56 0.58 
Experienced labor market shocks (number of years)  -0.16  -0.31 
  -0.10  -0.22 
Both the above (number of years) 0.44    
  0.34       
R ratios 3.40  1.98  3.35  3.24  
    2.28  
Notes:  The number in each cell is the estimate of measures of downward mobility from a separate 
regression of supports redistribution on measures of downward mobility using the restricted (the 
first number) or full model (the second). All estimates are multiplied by 100 for legibility. The 
numbers in the last row are the R-ratios; in column 4 the first number is the R-ratio for responded 
to shocks by taking extreme measures, the second experienced labor market shocks. They are 
calculated as                                            
 
 
 
 
